International democracy promotion: a role for public goods theory? by Burnell, Peter J.
  
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Peter J. Burnell 
Article Title: International democracy promotion: a role for public goods 
theory? 
Year of publication: 2008 
Link to published version: http;//dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/13569770801913249 
Publisher statement: None 
 
 
 
International democracy promotion: a role for public goods theory? 
 
Peter Burnell, Dept. of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, 
England♣
 
The state of international democracy promotion is in flux. After more than fifteen 
years of increasing activity and with more organisations and resources devoted to 
promoting democracy than ever before, a mood of uncertainty surrounds democracy 
support’s current performance and future prospects. The last decade has also seen 
the emergence of a new literature on global public goods theory, offering fresh 
analytical perspectives on pressing issues in international affairs like peace, security, 
development, and environmental sustainability.  The future of democracy promotion 
will be determined chiefly by the realities of the political market place, in societies on 
both sides of the relationship. But could recent theorising about the market for global 
public goods offer some analytical support for making sense of its current condition 
and, by identifying the democratic peace as a global public good strengthen the case 
for greater international cooperation in promoting democracy as means to achieve 
that end?  
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Introduction  
This article begins by noting the malaise that currently hangs over the international 
democracy promotion industry and then draws attention to recent literature that seeks 
                                                 
♣ The author thanks the referees of Contemporary Politics for constructive comments on an earlier 
version.  
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to identify global public goods. Its main purpose is to show whether that literature has 
the potential to offer insights into the current condition and future prospects of 
international democracy promotion, by throwing features of the ‘market’ for 
democracy promotion on both the supply and demand side into sharper relief. Like 
recent applications of global public goods theory to international problems, this 
inquiry should be viewed more as a tentative exploration than a set of definitive 
answers to some inherently problematic big analytical and real world political 
questions. The idea of global political goods has recently gained in international 
recognition because advocates believe it offers a powerful framework for developing 
arguments in favour of more international cooperation and greater international 
provision in response to major global ills. It does not command universal acceptance. 
But can the framework be extended to lend support to international democracy 
promotion especially given the connections that many of its supporters make between 
democracy and democracy promotion with the desirability of progress towards greater 
international peace?  Indeed, could international democracy promotion itself be a kind 
of international public good, and if so, how should the market-place for it be 
described? Before addressing these questions it will be useful to briefly summarise 
some recent trends in democracy promotion.  
 
Rising Supply, Falling Confidence 
Since the late 1980s there has been a steady and politically significant increase in 
activities that are variously labelled international democracy promotion, democracy 
support, and democracy assistance, together with a growing number of organisations 
in many countries and expanding budgets designed to support these activities. 
Democracy assistance usually refers to non-coercive and concessionary political 
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assistance projects or programmes, sometimes financial or material but more often 
taking the form of technical support and transfers of knowledge about democracy and 
how to establish and consolidate democracy. In contrast democracy promotion can 
mean a much wider range of approaches or strategies, using such instruments as 
diplomatic pressure, the linking of relevant political conditionalities to financial, 
commercial, or political agreements. Support to national economic and social 
development, which the democratization literature views as beneficial if not 
indispensable for sustainable democracy in developing countries, offer a further 
variant. The differences between approaches are elaborated and discussed further 
elsewhere (Burnell 2005 and 2008). For the practitioners of democracy promotion just 
as for much of the academic literature on democratization, democracy is understood 
in terms of western-style liberal democracy, akin to what Robert Dahl famously called 
polyarchy. It is more than just elections; it includes extensive political and civil 
liberties; and it differs from the deliberative notions that feature in some 
contemporary theorising on democracy’s meaning, while being far removed from the 
more radical participatory grass-roots models that much emancipatory theory 
recommends. This article dwells mainly on the subject of democracy assistance and 
takes the polyarchical understanding of democracy as a given, but that does not mean 
they should not be subjected to close critical examination. 
 
The democracy promotion industry is multinational and its size at an all-time 
high. Current spending ranges somewhere between US$5 and $10 billion annually; 
definitional problems and data limitations prevent more precise and universally 
acceptable estimates. Some of the longest established actors are Germany’s Stiftungen 
(political foundations), for whom democracy support abroad complements extensive 
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civic education work at home.  More countries than ever have their own publicly 
funded institutes, foundations, government departments or sub-departments either 
dedicated to or involved in democracy promotion activities. Inter-governmental 
organisations too are now very actively involved, ranging from the Commonwealth to 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. One of the largest is the 
United Nations Development Programme, which claims to support democratic 
governance in over 130 countries. Also, 2005 saw the launch of a new United Nations 
Democracy Fund. Intergovernmental organisations at the regional level for example 
the Organization of American States have committed themselves to maintaining 
democratic rule in the member states. And the European Union (EU) and its members 
broadly match the commitment to assisting democratic progress in other countries that 
the United States government provides through its United Sates Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the publicly-funded National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED, founded in 1983) together with its affiliates the National 
Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute. The activities of these and 
other organisations are increasingly well documented – if not yet fully understood - in 
a now substantial literature on democracy promotion. Indeed, growth in academic and 
other independent commentary has been both a consequence and a contributory factor 
in the enhanced prominence achieved by international democracy promotion, 
especially in the established democracies. The International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance, in Stockholm, has played a part in this. As a research 
institute and knowledge bank it specialises in offering that most classic of public 
goods, relevant knowledge, on an impartial, global and non-profit basis. And yet not 
only have observers tended to highlight shortcomings and other troubling features of 
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democracy promotion, which was bound to happen, but the current mood in and 
around the industry itself appears to be at an all-time low.  
 
While this combination of rising supply and falling confidence is not necessarily 
paradoxical the reasons have been much speculated on: only the most important will 
be briefly mentioned here. Pride of place is usually given to the confusion of 
democracy assistance with what in the light of the US response to 9/11 has come to be 
known as ‘regime change’ – the forcible removal of governments that are accused of 
being despotic and unfriendly to human rights, and which may enable democratic rule 
to be put in its place, for foreign policy reasons that are very different. The military 
interventions to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan (2001) and Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq (2003) are the paradigm cases. Arguably the objective and the means used both 
flouted international law. These interventions, compounded further by the failure to 
usher in stable democratic government have cast a long shadow. Although not 
constituting a serious logical challenge to the claims to legitimacy of democracy 
assistance, they have made it possible for democracy promotion tout court to attract 
condemnation by association. For rulers with no or very questionable liberal 
democratic credentials, the Iraq war and subsequent events have probably made it 
easier to mobilise nationalist resentment against external efforts to bring democracy. 
In addition, the growing assertiveness of President Putin’s international stance (see 
Ambrosio 2007, for how this has been influenced by Putin’s domestic political 
agenda), backed by Russia’s dramatically improved financial fortunes courtesy of the 
greatly increased international price of oil, and the riches now accruing to some 
commodity exporting developing world governments as a result of rising demand 
from the booming economies of China and India, have all served to reduce the 
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leverage that western governments could exert on behalf of democracy promotion.  In 
several important countries then the ‘backlash against democracy promotion’ is 
nothing short of a ‘pushback against democracy’ itself. Perhaps even more portentous, 
the 15 June 2006 Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which 
includes China, Russia and several Central Asian states, appeared to invoke the short 
step from upholding authoritarian rule at home to the collective provision of counter-
promotion measures and an increase in mutual political support  to one another abroad  
 
Beginning in 2006 terms like ‘rollback’, backlash’ and ‘pushback’ have come 
to be bandied around for depicting a climate for democratisation and more specifically 
for welcoming democracy support that has turned hostile in many places (see for 
example Carothers 2006a; Carothers 2006b; Gershman and Allen 2006; Puddington 
2007). More specifically for the EU, the easy ‘victories’ have now been won. The 
political conditionalities that the EU attached to eligibility for accession, embodied in 
the 1993 Copenhagen agreement, have done their work in helping former communist 
states in Central and Eastern Europe build on their democratic transitions that were 
already underway. For them, democratisation was an obvious choice if they were to 
leave the Soviet/Russian embrace. Now, in the ‘European neighbourhood’ and more 
distant countries, where the reform incentive from joining the EU is not on offer, EU 
hopes of inducing substantial democratic progress look far less realistic, especially in 
countries like Belarus where no strong domestic impetus for democratic transition 
exists. Even so, future levels of support for democracy promotion from Europe (where 
in 2007 a new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights was endowed 
with 1.1 billion Euros over the next seven years) and some smaller actors like 
Australia’s Centre for Democratic Institutions look more secure than does the 
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commitment of the United States. In the US the return of a vigorous security-driven 
realism shaping the Bush administration’s foreign policy, a recognition that elections 
elsewhere can produce outcomes unfavourable to US interests (as in President 
Chavez’ Venezuela and Palestine’s Hamas in 2006), plus speculation that the next 
administration will want to distance itself from President Bush’s high-profile verbal 
embrace of freedom and democracy objectives, all sustain a belief that the political 
commitment to promoting democracy abroad could now have passed its peak.  The 
lack of ‘follow-through’ in US democracy promotion as the Bush administration has 
reverted more wholeheartedly to former policies of supporting states like Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt (in July 2007 both negotiated very large arms deals with the US) -  
considered important allies in the war on terror and important to US security interests 
- is another large part of the despondency among US supporters of democracy 
promotion 
 
In the early 1990s democracy promotion was supposed to help rescue 
international development aid from what at the time was seen to be a growth in ‘aid 
fatigue’. Following a UN-sponsored international conference on financing 
development, in Monterey, Mexico, 2002, development aid spending has recovered 
and development cooperation with the poorest countries has gained a new lease of 
life. Now it is democracy support that appears to be in trouble. At times like this, 
when the sentiments expressed by experts such as Thomas Carothers and prominent 
academics like Larry Diamond (2007), supplemented by the writer’s own 
observations in regular encounters with democracy assistance advisers and 
practitioners, range from caution to despair, can global public goods theory come to 
the rescue - in the sense of offering a new, more positive lens through which to 
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examine international democracy promotion, both the supply and demand? Or does it 
point to deeper limitations than just the policy mistakes that have been made in regard 
to regime change especially and the inevitable obsolescence of the enlarging EU’s 
apparent record of success?  
 
Public Goods and Global Public Goods 
Public goods analysis has been applied to global problems for some time, but in 
contrast to globalization and as Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999b: xxii) remark, 
discussion of what global public goods really are and the candidates has been sparse. 
That began to change in the late 1990s and the beginnings of a new literature (drawn 
on extensively here) questioning the adequacy of traditional concepts and theories of 
public goods for understanding current international realities (for example Kaul, 
Grunberg and Stern 1999a; Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven and Mendoza 2003a). 
International financial stability, a multilateral trade regime, reducing the excessive 
disease burden, preventing deadly conflict, climate stability, and a global 
communications network are typical if disparate examples of what are now being 
cited as global public goods, namely goods whose benefits are almost universal in 
terms of countries, people, and generations. 
 
Classically, public goods are goods that when supplied are necessarily 
supplied to everybody. They are non-rivalrous in consumption (consumption by one 
party leads to no subtraction from any other party’s consumption) and the benefits are 
non-exclusionary (non-payers are not denied access): this latter makes free riding 
possible. However, there is no logical requirement that all derive equal benefit or 
utility. And in practice for many people there may even be barriers to access. In 
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reality, pure public goods are probably rare; but there are impure public goods which 
possess public good attributes, while also being partly private. It is not unusual for the 
term public good to be used to encompass the pure and impure varieties. 
  
To qualify as a public good does not require that the good already is or should 
be supplied by a public body. But the closer a good is to becoming a pure public 
good, then the more likely that the market - in the sense of market-based transactions 
carried out for profit by non-state actors - will undersupply it, or not supply it at all. 
For this reason public goods are often dubbed a case of market failure.  Lighthouses 
offer an illustration: although some have been built and operated by voluntary 
subscription, and some are financed by the levy of local harbour dues (which can be 
avoided by ships that merely pass in the night), fully adequate provision is often left 
to the tax system and publicly-funded (if not also publicly-delivered) supply.  
 
A public good’s peculiar status and the special arrangements needed to ensure 
provision have long featured in accounts of the roles of state and market in the 
domestic political economy. More recently, debates in international political economy 
have started to develop the idea of global public goods, identifying comparable 
problems of global underprovision, even though some of official development 
assistance can be said to address specific global public goods needs as well as the 
purely national or local needs of developing country recipients. Indeed even some 
country-specific aid programmes may take on an international public goods character 
once all the positive externalities are taken into account. To illustrate, Kaul, Grunberg 
and Stern (1999c: 12) say that a poverty alleviation programme in Africa could be a 
global public good if it contributes to conflict prevention and international peace. 
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What is more, they argue that when attention is switched to the international arena 
there are grounds for being less rigid in determining what qualifies as a public good 
even if not for relaxing the classical definition (the literature here is not entirely clear 
on the difference). In fact some of the writers go as far as to say that decisions on 
what are global public goods are a matter of policy choice and to that extent the goods 
are a social construct (for example Kaul and Mendoza 2003: 104): ‘In any event, the 
defining characteristic of many public goods are not inherent and are often socially 
endogenous’ (Kaul and Mendoza 2003: 86). For this reason we should accept that the 
public goods status of some goods may be variable and subject to change, even if the 
strict definition of a pure public good remains constant. 
 
Global Public Goods, Peace and Democracy 
Peace and security, law and order and development are pure public goods on any 
conventional definition. International peace and global security are among those 
goods now being said to be quintessential global public goods, in substance and form 
(for example Mendez 1999: 404). And peace and security are two rationales that have 
featured prominently in accounts of the policy drivers for democracy promotion.  
Jünemann and Knodt (2007: 360-1) for instance call the democratic peace thesis a 
‘leitmotif’ of EU foreign relations and a primary explanation of its democracy support 
activities in the neighbourhood. US President Clinton frequently referred to a 
democratic peace; and both the EU and (even more so) President George W. Bush 
have argued that democracy is an antidote to terrorism and presented democracy 
support as useful to the war on terror although more scholarly inspection is less 
supportive of such claims (see for example Dalacoura 2006).  Moreover peace and 
security underpin other global public goods like sustainable development and poverty 
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reduction. According to Mendez (1999: 388) ‘Welfare economists, in fact, may deem 
peace even more fundamental than a public good. They may consider it an enabling 
institution of the market mechanism and an essential element of the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics’ (presumably without losing its public good status).  
 
That international peace is a pure global public good looks beyond 
contestation. More debatable perhaps is the inclusion (by Kaul, Conceição, Le 
Goulven and Mendoza 2003b: 44) of the institutional infrastructure to foster universal 
human rights, transparency and accountable governance in the international 
community’s vision of the ‘global public domain’. Yet in so far as most governments 
either claim to be democratic or to be moving towards it, democracy or at minimum 
some of its leading features could be considered a national public good, even though 
it is often more of an aspirational good and may be little more than a rhetorical good 
in some places. The idea of a democratic peace in international affairs looks more like 
a global public good. It has the properties of non-excludability and non-rivalry. The 
idea that democracies do not go to war with other democracies is of course one of the 
best known and most durable claims in international relations theory, albeit not one 
that has gone unchallenged in the voluminous commentary. And while a democratic 
peace may be considered a final global public good the same credentials may well not 
apply to all the purported benefits of democratisation let alone international 
democracy support, even though support for democratisation can be argued to be one 
pathway to realising peace, both within conflict-ridden societies and in the relations 
between societies, that is, for a domestic democratic peace and peace among 
democracies. 
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While one society’s enjoyment of liberal democracy of course does not reduce 
another’s access to that good, the international resources that are consumed through 
supporting its democratic development will necessarily be denied to others: there is an 
opportunity cost. The democracy assistance will be a private good to the country in 
question, even when publicly funded and provided by public agents. And yet the 
‘neighbourhood effect’, confirmed by findings suggesting that the chances of  a 
country democratising tend to increase when it is situated next to democratic 
neighbours, indicates there can be positive spill-over effects across borders even from 
such ‘private’ goods (see for example Brinks and Coppedge 2006).  To the extent that 
this obtains, even democracy promotion, then, might be said to at least share some of 
the properties of an impure regional public good. It may also be worth noting that 
over 100 countries belong to the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental 
organization of democracies and democratizing countries at the United Nations 
ostensibly committed to strengthening and deepening democratic norms and practices 
worldwide, which offers some support to McFaul’s (2004-05) claim that democracy 
promotion has become a ‘world value’– opponents and not its supporters have the 
onus of justifying their position – even if not yet an accepted global public good 
 
A further boost to the clues to the identity of global public goods especially in 
the context of policy-oriented debate came with the publication of the report Meeting 
Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the National Interest, of the 
International Task Force on Global Public Goods (2006). What began as an initiative 
of the French and Swedish governments presented its report first to the Annual 
Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank group in 2006. While 
acknowledging there can be important provision of global public goods at the national 
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level it argued strongly for increased international cooperation so as to ensure an 
adequate supply. And although international democracy promotion is nowhere 
mentioned, ends like peace and security as well as development, which democracy 
promotion is supposed to help, are very prominent. 
 
The Report advances the view that global public goods are ‘issues that are 
broadly conceived as important to the international community, that for the most part 
cannot or will not be adequately addressed by individual countries acting alone and 
that are defined through a broad international consensus or a legitimate process of 
decision-making’ (International Task Force 2006: viii). Of particular significance is 
that as well applying the term global public goods to highly valued end conditions like 
peace, the Report follows Kaul, Grunberg and Stern’s (1999c: 13) lead by including 
‘intermediate’ public goods, that is to say the institutional or instrumental mechanisms 
by which the final outcomes can be secured. Accordingly many public goods ‘are not 
abstract concepts; they are instruments to address real-world problems’ (International 
Task Force 2006: ix). So, just as lighthouses are often cited as examples of a public 
good when the desired outcome (the good) is safe passage, so an international 
financial regulation or regulatory regime that secures international financial stability 
too becomes a global public good. The same reasoning could be extended to other 
arenas. Thus Hamburg and Holl (1999: 377) imply that when democracy support 
becomes essential to establishing a ‘culture of prevention’ of deadly conflict (a ‘key 
public good’) it too becomes an important public good. 
 
The Report also confirms that while a global public good is a good whose 
benefits could in principle be enjoyed by the governments and people of all states, 
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there are also international public goods, which simply benefit more than one country 
or group.  Crucially it says that for any particular good to qualify as a global public 
good does not require universal agreement. Once again, the claim is made that a 
particular good’s status is contingent on policy choice. ‘A critical reality of global 
public goods is that they are contested; states have different interests, values and 
preferences, even where they share long-term goals’ (International Task Force 2006: 
86). Governments of every political persuasion have been known to sacrifice public 
goods for short term interest from time to time; some even question the longer term 
‘goodness’ of a purported good, such as an open trading system, and even more so the 
international institutional framework for achieving that end. But this does not remove 
the applicability of the concept. And thus it seems that for democratic peace or 
perhaps democracy support to possess global, or more modestly, international public 
good properties, the absence of serious opposition in the real world is not a 
requirement. 
  
The Report makes the conventional observation that the ‘very nature of global 
public goods means that demand will tend to outweigh supply’ (International Task 
Force 2006: viii). This has always been true of democratic peace in international 
affairs, which of course explains how international democracy promotion has come to 
be offered as a panacea. In fact in contemporary debate there are examples of 
democratisation (and hence by implication democracy support) being considered as a 
solution, whole or in part, to every one of the six main clusters of ‘global security’ 
threat that the Report lists from UN sources: war between states; internal conflict; 
terrorism; organised crime; the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction; and 
poverty, infectious disease and severe environmental degradation. In all cases the 
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right response to market failure is said to include at minimum greater inter-
governmental cooperation.  If this holds true of a democratic peace then there must be 
implications for international democracy promotion too. But what does the market for 
democracy promotion look like, assuming a market exists: are the demand and the 
supply easy to characterise?  
 
Market-place for International Democracy Promotion 
A market is an institution in which exchanges take place in a more or less patterned 
way (Hodgson 2001: 982). There is a demand and a supply. The existence of markets 
(or a market place), where public bodies may be among the parties to the deals, can be 
distinguished from the more specialised conception of market exchange associated 
with private goods and ‘free market’ forces. Public goods theory tells us that non-state 
actors in the market for private goods will under-provide public goods. In fact in 
democracy assistance all the main suppliers obtain the bulk of their resources from 
public funds; and governmental and intergovernmental multilateral agencies are 
prominent providers. But what do we really know about the demand and the supply? 
   
Demand-side 
Amartya Sen (1999) famously said that by the end of the twentieth century democracy 
had become a universal value – its status as a universally relevant system now 
accepted. That oppressed peoples in many parts of the world have expressed demands 
for more freedom and more democracy, sometimes at great personal risk is 
undeniable. It is also true that all the demands are still far from being fulfilled: the 
good of democracy is underused; moreover in some countries the levels of democracy 
and its quality are being eroded. But not all democratic aspirations equate to what the 
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international democracy promoters understand by democracy – a point partly 
conceded in their customary declaration that it is not their intention to export a 
particular model of democracy let along try to impose liberal democracy per se, which 
would be an oxymoron. The mantra ‘democratic politics cannot be transplanted to or 
imposed on a country from outside…The demand for democratic politics must come 
from within (Department for International Development- DfID 2007: 3) is quite often 
although not always accompanied by remarks that suggest democracy’s character too 
must reflect local circumstances. 
 
Worldwide support for the idea of democracy is born out by the kind of 
evidence collected in democracy barometers or attitude surveys that are now routinely 
administered across regions such as Africa, post-communist Europe, Latin America 
and elsewhere. DfID (2007: 20) claims that 80 per cent of respondents in a poll of 
50,000 people across 65 countries in 2005 said democracy is the best system of 
government. However there are at least three grounds for caution about such claims, 
even while bearing in mind that statements purporting to identify what counts as a 
(global) public good seem almost bound to be open to contestation. First, in some 
non-democracies the ruling authorities do not allow opinions on this matter to be 
expressed freely even in the form of attitude surveys let alone the more conventional 
political and social channels associated with a relatively free society. Where the free 
expression of demand is suppressed, estimates of inferred demand may be the best we 
can hope for. Second, the most recent democracy barometers (see ‘The Democracy 
Barometers (Part I)(2007) reveal significant and growing evidence  that support for 
democracy is eroding or becoming more ambivalent in a number of places – so much 
so that Carothers (2006b) went so far as to say US democracy promoters ‘can no 
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longer assume a majority of citizens in countries where they work believe that 
democracy is necessarily the best political system’ (which of course does not say they 
actually oppose democracy). In Russia alone the data appears to indicate that more 
than 50 million people are comfortable with the idea of being ruled by a dictator.  The 
reasons behind the opinion trends are usually thought to include an unfavourable 
experience of democracy, the persistence of pressing socio-economic problems in 
particular - although the bearing this has on people’s political views is not uniform 
and may not be clear-cut.  The inability of such political institutions as the political 
parties and the politicians themselves to command popular respect has also played a 
part, although this may offer less ground for being disillusioned with the idea of 
democracy than it provides evidence of democratic shortfalls in the ‘new 
democracies’.  Third, perhaps in no country where liberal democracy has not already 
been tried successfully should evidence of either strong or weak support for the idea 
of democracy be assigned total credence, and of course even strong support can be 
translated only imperfectly into claims about demands for the introduction of 
democracy - a process of change that people might judge hazardous and likely to be 
accompanied by grave side-effects, for example political instability and potential for 
inter-communal conflict.  
 
Anyway, evidence from the barometers reminds us not to dismiss lightly all 
the arguments against democratic reform made by ruling elites in countries that are 
not liberal democracies. Even the literature on democratisation harbours some 
genuine reservations about democracy’s appropriateness to all cases, while not 
actually calling it a demerit good. The reservations are usually couched in the form of 
doubts about whether western style liberal democracy suits every society especially at 
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this moment in its history. Thus in some Islamic societies there are very real 
difficulties in reconciling some parts of the religious credo with major tenets of liberal 
democracy, most notably in regard to the idea that the people are sovereign and that 
men and women should share power equally.  Another argument, well rehearsed in 
the past in the context of  so-called ‘Asian values’ says that priority should be given to 
social and economic modernisation and development. Another, more specific to China 
and explored by Lynch (2004) is the claim that the Chinese view democratisation as a 
challenge to the country’s very identity and place in the world. While not rejected for 
its own sake democratic change is opposed because it threatens to sacrifice an 
imagined national essence to western-centred narratives and global culture. 
 
Although the idea of democracy first arose in and for the nation state, 
international democracy promotion in its less consensual manifestations at least seems 
to imply that choices over political rule should no longer be left solely to national 
self-determination. Quite obviously, the idea of sovereignty, to which the established 
democracies still have great attachment in regard to the governance of their own 
affairs, poses problems for democracy promotion not least where authoritarian rulers 
reject the democratisation agenda. Whereas sovereignty issues tend to obstruct the 
supply of international public goods more generally, with powerful states refusing to 
offer sufficient support (as with development aid in the past) or being reluctant to 
submit themselves to a universally binding regulatory regime (as in the US’s 
continuing refusal to agree binding cuts in carbon emissions), in democratisation and 
democracy promotion the impediment appears to be more in countries on the other 
side, where popular demand for democracy is not allowed effective expression or the 
authorities deny access to democracy support. In the meantime, however, credulity is 
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not overtaxed by arguing that non-democracies free ride on the peace that exists 
between democracies while not contributing to democracy promotion or, even, paying 
the democratic ‘price’ at home. They can gain from the measure of international 
stability and the advantages bestowed on international trade, commerce and 
investment that may be attributed to the zones of democratic peace. Such states as 
China and Russia can be considered as beneficiaries in many ways; perhaps their 
peoples even share in the aspect of the global good of peace that Mendez (1999: 389) 
calls ‘enjoyment from afar’. At the same time they are very unlikely to fall victim to 
the reality that democracies sometimes make war on non-democracies. In any case 
most democracies do not have a reputation for being belligerent, and most non-
democracies can feel secure.   
 
However, while it is not possible to quantify accurately the true size of the 
demand for democracy and whether a declining market for democracy now exists, 
even an unfulfilled demand is of course not the same thing as a demand for the 
attentions of international democracy promotion. To find out more on this it would be 
instructive to differentiate between the views towards the different approaches, 
methods or instruments that comprise democracy promotion. Similar to the demand 
for democracy, which is best understood as not one single market but several markets 
depending on how democracy is understood, the local circumstances and views about 
the most prudent pace of change, so it is useful to think of there being discrete 
markets for democracy promotion, for at least five reasons. 
 
First, the supporters and opponents of reform inside and outside government 
can be expected to have different views, mirroring their differences on their county’s 
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present political condition and on ideas of democracy. Second, the elite’s views may 
not represent popular feeling; and different socio-political groups in the populace will 
judge the desirability of democracy support in their own way, in accordance with 
what they believe would be the consequences for them. Third,  a reasonable 
assumption is that attitudes towards democracy assistance are probably much more 
sympathetic than attitudes towards (threatened) military intervention, except perhaps 
in the special case of conflict-ridden societies where international humanitarian 
intervention, peace-making and peace-building are accepted as necessary conditions 
for building democracy. A government’s compliance with democratic political 
conditionalities when these have been attached to desirable offers of aid, trade or 
some other concession from abroad cannot be assumed to betoken support for this 
approach to promoting democracy, although reformers might actually welcome the 
conditionalities, and some reluctant reformers could value the excuse it provides to 
concede domestic pressures for change, pragmatically and with honour. Some will 
think the circumstances can be manipulated to their own personal or partisan political 
advantage. 
 
Fourth, even within just democracy assistance much anecdotal evidence 
suggests that views are much less positive in regard to some avenues, for instance 
support to political parties, than to others, civil society organisations for example. 
And inside single sectors preferences exist too. For instance in regard to legislative 
strengthening there seems to be a considerable appetite for infrastructural support, 
more computers for  example, but less support for politically intrusive forms of 
engagement by outsiders that might comprise more effective strategies. Finally, views 
may vary according to who is identified as the funding source and the actual provider 
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- foreign actors versus local agents (Carothers 2006b warns that many people, both 
political elites and ordinary citizens, now have a negative view of American 
democracy support organisations). Common to all these nuances is that more 
investigation is needed into the actual demand for assistance, in particular the 
attitudes of ordinary people – many of whom may simply be ignorant about 
democracy promotion, its limits and possibilities - and not just the individuals, groups 
and organisations who are partners in assistance programmes and whose role as 
stakeholders might be expected to colour their view. Without such research there can 
be no automatic presumption that a demand for democratic change let alone 
favourable views on an idea of democracy translate into an equivalent demand for 
democracy support. 
 
Furthermore, when seeking to assess more precisely the demand for 
democracy assistance there is a sense in which the supply side actors might have to be 
brought into the equation too, for reasons explained below. 
 
Supply-side 
 
If public goods tend to be underprovided is this really true of democracy support also? 
The provision of democracy support is a function of the number of democracies and 
the commitment of their leaders, among other things. Irrespective of how far 
democracy promotion can be credited for the increasing number of democracies in the 
world, one consequence has been to add to the number of actors engaged in offering 
democracy support. Poland and the Czech Republic are examples of countries that 
have graduated from the democracy promotion demand side to the supply side. And 
like India’s contribution as a major founding sponsor of the UN Democracy Fund, 
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such recruits bring additional legitimacy if not greater credibility as well to the 
international promotion of democracy. Legitimacy is something that the global public 
goods literature maintains may be critical to the success of endeavours intended to 
address chronic underprovision.  
 
In the same way that development aid evolved from being a ‘temporary 
expedient of cold war diplomacy’ to become much more durable (Lancaster 2007: 5) 
and adapted its purposes to survive, so democracy support - which escalated in 
response to the end-of-the-cold war diplomacy – has within a decade or so become 
institutionalised, that is to say acquired the organisational trappings of permanence. 
As the policy drivers behind this development have moved to embrace such ideas as 
democratisation being good for development and reducing domestic conflict, the 
democratic peace thesis, and democracy as an antidote to international terrorism, 
signs of being  adaptable like this resemble the development aid industry’s own past 
record of showing every intention of being here to stay.  
 
Probably few people have ever doubted that some least developed countries do 
need some help, although the kind of help that would be most beneficial is more 
controversial. However a long-standing view claims that a major constituency for 
humanitarian and development aid is located in precisely those countries that provide 
it, the donors. This perspective dwells on such aid policy purpsoes as the desire to 
secure good relations with the governments of the developing countries, for various 
commercial, economic and political reasons. Moreover the donor country publics 
have been portrayed as buying a satisfied conscience through acts of charity and 
supporting official development assistance, which alleviates their sense of guilt. In 
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this reasoning, aid supply and demand are to be found in the same place. Mosley 
(1985) for example portrayed development aid as an ‘international public good’ 
where the taxpayers who finance it are the consumers on the demand side. Sogge and 
Zadek (1996: 70) go even further when they say the ‘market demand’ for private aid 
stems from the ‘funding authorities’; the voluntary aid agencies act as ‘market-
makers’, eliciting the ‘market’ or ‘effective demand’ that comprises the spending 
preferences of the donors. In fact there has always been a critical strand to the 
development discourse, rooted in both socialist and ‘free market’ perspectives that 
says poor countries would be better off without much aid. The extent to which this 
resonates for democracy assistance is debateable. But many comments heard from its 
recipients do echo the somewhat less critical claim often levelled against development 
aid, that the offers of assistance and their terms and conditions shape – construct - the 
demands that the would-be beneficiaries express.  
 
Nevertheless, in the absence of accurate information about the real demand for 
democracy promotion more generally and democracy assistance in particular it is 
impossible to estimate an optimum level of supply. When trying to gauge the 
adequacy it is important not to repeat the mistakes made in the widespread reports of 
development aid ‘fatigue’ in the 1989s, when claims about (trends in) aid volumes 
were conflated with judgments about how (in)adequate these were to address the 
(growing) problems they were supposed to meet, which were then confused with the 
reasons that speculation said lay behind the fatigue (see Burnell 1997: 189-92). 
Moreover on the supply side it is important to distinguish between the professional 
interest of institutions that have a stake in supporting development or democratisation, 
or both,  and the commitment shown by the political leaders. Although as the 
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International Task Force (2006: 77) noted in regard to global public goods, mobilising 
the concentrated energy of national leaders is a major challenge, very little analytical 
attention has been given to how any such commitment should be measured. While 
barometers to measure popular support for democracy in non-democracies are now 
routine fixtures, there is no democracy support index that measures the international 
political resolve to extend support. 
 
On measuring commitment to help spread democracy the sums voted for 
democracy assistance are probably more revealing than formal statements of support, 
even though by comparison to development aid, the monetary value may be less 
important than are democratic reputation, political sensitivity and skill in the way 
support for democratic objectives is extended. In line with the global public goods 
literature constructive participation in international cooperation, and support for 
multilateral initiatives, could be another proxy indicator. But should a willingness to 
employ the less consensual approaches to promoting democracy, like political 
conditionalities and diplomatic pressure for instance, necessarily be read as denoting 
stronger support? Does the promotion of democracy not just for the sake of 
democracy or democratic peace but to serve the other interests of the democracies 
itself betoken a sign of weakness?  Shallow commitment, in contrast, is perhaps easier 
to pin down, namely where foreign policy sacrifices democratic goals to the expedient 
pursuit of vital strategic interests, examples of which in a European context are 
provided by Youngs (2006) and Jünemann and Knodt (2007). Youngs’ (2006) 
portrayal of the relatively lukewarm commitment of certain European governments 
like Spain’s and France’s may qualify them as free-riders on more active EU member 
states. But the fact that even the democratic peace must compete for attention with 
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other global and international as well as national public goods cannot be ignored, 
notwithstanding the symbiotic relationship that many of the different public goods 
may have to one another. 
 
Even when engaging in the more straightforward task of calculating the 
amount of democracy assistance, not only is this a very inexact science for reasons 
already noted but there are some indications - most notably in the US - that the sums 
could soon begin to level off, or even fall. Recent levels of appropriation including for 
the NED have been heavily biased by special earmarking (most notably for political 
projects in Iraq) which risks diluting the overall quality and effectiveness. These will 
not continue indefinitely. The NED’s (2007) own view that democracy assistance is 
‘now under attack from many quarters’ refers to hostility at home as well as abroad. 
The backlash is in Washington as well as much further afield, something that itself 
could be attributed democratic credentials in as much as it reflects public attitudes,  
gleaned by US German Marshall Fund (2006) surveys that show falling levels of 
support in the US for the idea that the US should try to help establish democracy in 
other countries (the support of 71 per cent in Europe compared favourably with the 45 
per cent recorded in the US, which concealed even weaker support among 
Democrats).  Even in Europe the shadow of regime change and a disposition to 
associate democracy support with hegemonic pretensions of the US does seem to 
harm enthusiasm for promoting democracy among Europe’s left-wing politicians 
(Mathieson and Youngs 2006) – precisely the spectrum that might otherwise have 
been expected to offer firm support, given its traditional alignment with human rights 
causes and internationalist positions. This weakness is reinforced by Europe’s 
inability to decide how to position its democracy support in relation to US efforts now 
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that EU enlargement is almost complete, in parts of the world that will never be 
candidates for accession. Should European and other actors cooperate more closely 
with the Americans? And in what ways should Europe try to be very distinctive in its 
democracy assistance ambitions, activities and designs?  Failure to date to completely 
resolve these questions trouble some Europeans and probably reduce the impact of 
their commitment to supporting democracy.  
 
Furthermore, the theory that democracy benefits development, which in the 
1990s in the foreign and development policy circles of many developed donor 
democracies had provided some intellectual underpinning for democracy promotion, 
probably offers less support now. The priority accorded to state capacity-building in 
some countries and, almost everywhere much-needed improvements in governance 
and the rule of law are currently accorded great importance. Faith in the stronger 
merits of indirect strategies for achieving political change in developing countries 
through efforts aimed in the first instance at creating what may be necessary 
economic and social conditions for stable democracy, through development aid, 
commands considerable support in the aid bureaucracies and the development 
discourse.  Meanwhile, even a note of intellectual scepticism towards the idea of a 
democratic peace has crept in, namely the very controversial argument that 
notwithstanding peace among democracies the process of becoming a democracy (that 
is, democratisation) increases the risk of war (see Mansfield and Snyder 2005). 
 
These are not the only problems that stand in the way of characterising not so 
much the present levels and trends in democracy assistance but more significantly, its 
actual performance - the results it achieves. An issue that has started to command 
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much attention only recently is the realisation that we do not really know how much 
of democracy promotion works, what works best, and how well. More particularly 
there is the recognition that we do not yet have methodological tools adequate for 
making reliable measurements even of the impact and effectiveness of democracy 
assistance, let alone all the other ways of trying to promote democracy and for 
comparing the performance of the different methods, instruments or approaches (see 
Burnell 2008). There is disagreement even about what can be measured by 
quantitative techniques and their worth relative to more qualitative-based assessments 
(see Burnell 2007). The grounds for wanting to establish whether democracy 
assistance works and which kinds work best hardly need much elaboration, although 
it is USAID that has gone farthest in trying to quantify the benefits and claim positive 
results (see Sarles 2007) – which is a reflection of the budget line’s political 
vulnerability in the US. One ground, based on Mosley’s (1985) study of economic 
development aid is that perceptions of its quality may exert an influence upon the 
supply, through the consequences for the amount of political support that is offered. 
The impatience of law-makers to see convincing evidence that democracy assistance 
represents good value for money, however, can distort the assessment process and 
may engender misleading results. Where democratisation itself is a slow process and 
moves in a jagged or uneven way, international support and its evaluation should both 
take the long term view. In the US meanwhile concern has been voiced that claims for 
the successes of US democracy support can be counterproductive, by stiffening the 
resistance among democracy’s opponents and making it more difficult for democracy 
assistance partners to cooperate openly with external help. Contrary to what has been 
said about development aid, then, the real value of democracy support may sometimes 
move in inverse relationship to public perceptions of its worth.  
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 In summing up the market-place, just as the democracy promoters claim to tailor their 
activities to the demand for democracy, so the demand for democracy and the 
constituency for democracy support are not wholly independent of how democracy 
promotion and the underlying motives are perceived. Changes in demand and supply 
for democracy promotion are in some degree mutually constitutive.  For example the 
part played by democracy support in the so-called ‘colour revolutions’, Ukraine’s 
especially, is often credited with stiffening Putin’s opposition to democracy assistance 
activities in Russia. As with the challenge the EU faces of how to maintain its record 
by repeating the pro-democracy effects of enlargement in much less promising 
situations, success can appear to bring its own problems. Some evidence around the 
world suggests that market sentiment towards democracy is weakening; and political 
resistance to reform has increased. All this offers the democracy promoters grounds 
for being more pessimistic about their efforts compared to fifteen years ago, when the 
democratisation tide bore up confidence. But even though extensive hard evidence 
about democracy promotion’s performance is starting to be assembled only now, we 
cannot yet conclude that democracy promotion has moved from being the demand-
inspired activity seen in the 1990s towards becoming more of a supply-driven 
phenomenon kept alive by institutionalisation in the industry now. What is clear, 
however, is the contrast in fortunes with international development cooperation. The 
foreign aid industry has acquired a new buoyancy, born of a belief that the solutions 
to development problems are now better understood (helped by recent development 
success stories such as China, India and Vietnam) and that in the post-cold war period 
aid’s policy objectives have become increasingly sympathetic to the goal of poverty-
reduction. And of course the budget declines of the 1990s have been reversed. The 
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contrast – shown in suspicion that the rise to prominence of national and regional 
security issues in foreign policy thinking has been detrimental to a consistent 
commitment to promoting democracy; the growing reservations about prioritising 
democracy-building ahead of consolidating the state structures, the socio-economic 
conditions, and the rule of law (often referred to as ‘getting the sequencing right’) 
together with the persistent belief that domestic factors are more compelling than 
international factors as explanations of democratisation;  plus concerns over how to 
measure the impact of democracy assistance let alone its true  performance – all could 
not be more striking. Carothers’ (2006a: 56) pertinent remark that the ‘backlash’ 
against democracy promotion is ‘multi-layered’ could indeed be extended beyond the 
opposition by real political interests to encompass a variety of assaults on the 
intellectual reasons for promoting democracy too.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Theorising about global public goods is not yet fully developed. And yet already, by 
starting out from origins in a scholarly literature the idea of public goods has been 
stretched by its recent application to the examination of global issues of growing 
international concern. Like public goods per se, the instances of undisputed pure 
global public good are probably very rare. Nevertheless in some of its aspects recent 
literature on global public goods speaks to the contemporary state of international 
democracy promotion. While that state comprises a mixture of both positive and 
negative aspects as seen from the perspectives of actors centrally involved in trying to 
promote democracy, there is considerable scope for attaining more knowledge and 
better understanding of the exact nature of the market-place, including the origins and 
detailed specification of the demand. On the side of provision, uncertainties about the 
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problem of collective action and the feasibility of alternative policies are but two 
notable features that the discourse says are also common to all global public goods 
(Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999b: xxvi). Peace, democracy, and the democratic 
peace, separately and in terms of the causal relationships they may have to one 
another are all undersupplied relative to the general assumptions of their desirability.  
There is not simply market failure but, as with many global public goods, political 
failure too: the prevalence of stalled democratisations and democratic reversals tells 
us that international democracy promotion has not been adequate or wholly effective. 
That international democracy promotion cannot be described as a global public good 
in the purest sense seems clear, notwithstanding the potential it might have for helping 
to bring about such goods as a democratic peace.  Nevertheless, although the idea of 
intermediate global public goods is fairly new, arguably in this sense effective 
democracy assistance could be thought to exhibit some of the properties of at 
minimum of an international public good.  
 
Just as the publicness and privateness of many ‘public goods’ may not be 
fixed for ever, so the correct balance between private and public and between state-led  
versus intergovernmental, multilateral  and supra-national provision is not rigidly 
prescribed by global public goods theory either. Indeed the literature assumes that for 
many global public goods, national level provision will often come first. This has 
certainly been true of democracy promotion. However, recent writing on global public 
goods agrees that more meaningful international cooperation and, probably, greater 
provision by international public institutions (with the United Nations in the van) 
could be essential, even though such responses cannot be expected to resolve for all 
time arguments over where the correct balance between principles of sovereignty and 
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international intervention in a country’s politics should lie. These views may well 
have relevance to democracy assistance too, even though in the present climate 
especially there are reasons why democracy promotion actors outside the US might 
not want to (be seen to) collaborate too closely with the US government in these 
matters. So far a measure of political failure in organising democracy support has 
compounded the market failure for democracy assistance, although to call it a spoiled 
market in the light of the shadow cast by regime change and the confused association 
with US hegemony would be going too far.  But however damaging these current 
weaknesses on the supply side are, the normal preoccupation of public goods theory 
with the defining problem that is underprovision should not obscure the fact that in 
democracy promotion problems exist on the demand side too. That refers not just to 
the restrictions on access both to democracy and to receiving democracy support that 
obtain in many countries. For as the supply of democracy promotion has become 
more institutionalised it means also the difficulty of establishing the true demand for 
different kinds of democracy support, and separating those out from the undoubtedly 
well-intentioned but not wholly disinterested demand-raising promptings of supply 
side actors too. 
 
The geo-economic and geopolitical context for efforts intended to spread 
democracy are much less favourable now than they were at the time of the fall of the 
Berlin wall. Predictions about future support for promoting democracy remain 
hostage to near term electoral politics inside the established democracies, most 
notably the US. The shape of future developments inside such international 
organisations as the UN and EU looks very uncertain too. Unlike certain public goods 
where a reluctance to commit substantial public funds is a major reason for there 
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being too little supply, the commitment to democracy promotion is beholden to a 
more complex and shifting matrix of forces that influence foreign policy and 
international relations. Today the non-democracies include weak or fragile states and 
some very poor countries. They do not offer easy places in which to establish 
democracy. The challenge that democracy promotion now faces looks greater than 
before even as attitudes towards it have become less confident: these two trends are of 
course not unrelated. It is possible that withholding democracy support on the grounds 
that the prospects for democratic advance look bleak could have a self-fulfilling 
quality; and something similar may be true for many instances of public goods. 
Remaining largely silent towards predictions (other than presuming that global 
problems will intensify) while being in making recommendations is a feature of some 
recent global public goods literature that is worthy of emulation. Nevertheless, further 
developments in the application of global public goods theory for the purpose of 
identifying, analysing and addressing major problems may be worth tracking, for the 
insights they might give on the international promotion of democracy to the end of 
securing greater international peace. 
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